China & Taiwan Update, August 14, 2026

China & Taiwan Update, August 14, 2026

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Taiwan’s annual Han Kuang defense exercises continued to emphasize resilience and realism, focusing on real-world contingencies and incorporating new capabilities.Taiwanese and foreignobservers have criticized past Han Kuang exercises for being too scripted and lacking realism. Taiwan has sought to improve the realism of its exercises in recent years amid increasing short-of-war coercion by the PRC.[1] The 2026 Han Kuang exercise included a number of new drills. Taiwanese President William Lai announced an end to the drills on August 14 and emphasized Taiwan’s continuing efforts to improve supply chain resilience, particularly in the drone sector.[2]

This year’s Han Kuang exercise practiced an evacuation mission for President William Lai Ching-te amid a mock decapitation strike.[3] This was the first time Lai participated in such a drill. ISW-CDOT has previously reported on possible PRC efforts to practice decapitation strikes using “mock Taipei” complexes that mimic Taiwan’s Presidential Office and other significant government buildings.[4]

Taiwan also tested civilian responses to disruptions in internet connectivity for the first time.[5] Multiple Taiwanese counties participated in the drill, which emphasized maintaining public services throughout the internet slowdown.[6] The PRC may attempt to interfere with Taiwan’s connectivity during a military contingency, including cutting subsea internet cables. PRC-crewed ships have already used these abilities against cables connecting Taiwan to its outlying islands.[7] The PRC could also target Taiwan’s telecommunications and infrastructure using cyberattacks.[8]

Taiwan also practiced deploying electronic warfare vehicles to the mouth of the Tamsui River, where the PRC could enter to access Taipei, for the first time on August 5.[9] Taiwan’s Coast Guard Authority (CGA) also worked with the Taiwanese navy to enact an anti-blockade drill for the first time on August 12.[10] These drills illustrate Taiwan’s increasing commitment to addressing potential PRC contingencies

Taiwan also incorporated its new Littoral Combat Command (LCC) into the exercises. The LCC gave an order for an Anping-class vessel to lead four missile boats in a simulated encounter with PRC amphibious assault vessels during an August 8 drill.[11] Taiwan inaugurated the LCC in 2026 to streamline the management of coastal radar and anti-ship missile capabilities. The LCC will maintain Hsiung Feng missiles — some of which have ranges capable of striking the PRC’s coast — for Taiwan’s coastal defense.[12] The LCC will play a similar role in integrating drone warfare into Taiwan’s coastal defenses if Taiwan passes a special budget, which would cover the acquisition of thousands of attack and reconnaissance drones.[13] Taiwan incorporated drones in multiple Han Kuang 2026 exercises, including an August 13 drill that simulated the defense of a tunnel to block adversary forces from entering Taipei.[14]

PRC state-affiliated media downplayed and criticized the Han Kuang exercises, using them to advance typical critiques of Lai and Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). The PRC Ministry of Defense (MoD) during an August 14 press conference called Han Kuang a “charade” and accused the DPP of creating “panic.”[15] State-owned tabloid Global Times published an article arguing that Lai’s participation in the decapitation drill, as well as Taiwan’s incorporation of whole-of-society resilience drills, reflected the “militarization” of Taiwanese society.[16] An August 5 Global Times article cited a PRC military analyst who called the exercises “political show staged by the DPP.”[17] The same article called “resisting unification by force” a “dead end,” framing Taiwan’s self-defense efforts as escalatory.[18] Such rhetoric reflects typical PRC information operations meant to delegitimize Lai and the DPP.

The PRC may have used typhoon conditions to experiment with expanding its law enforcement jurisdiction over Taiwanese and international waters in the Taiwan Strait.The PRC’s Guangdong Maritime Safety Administration (MSA) announced a traffic control scheme for northbound vessels entering the Taiwan Strait between August 6 and 9, in anticipation of a typhoon entering the East China Sea.[19] The MSA announcement said that passing ships must “strictly comply with traffic control requirements” and “obey the instructions of on-site maritime management agencies.”[20] Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) and the CGA condemned the MSA announcement and stated that the Taiwan Strait consists of international waters and the PRC has no right to control traffic there.[21] The CGA urged commercial ships passing through the strait to disregard broadcasts from PRC authorities and notify Taiwanese authorities if they received such broadcasts.[22]

Taiwan’s Ocean Affairs Council (OAC) Deputy Minister Sung Cheng-en also criticized the PRC for monitoring a Japanese Coast Guard ship that sought refuge from the typhoon in the Taiwan Strait from August 6 to 10.[23] Sung said that Taiwan allows vessels of all nationalities, including PRC ships, to seek shelter in Taiwan-administered waters in emergencies.[24] Ship-tracking data from Starboard Maritime Intelligence showed that China Coast Guard (CCG) ship 2307 approached Japanese coast guard ship Urado in the southern part of the Taiwan Strait and kept pace with Urado as itsailed up and down the Strait between August 6 and 10.[25] The CCG ship operated in international waters and did not cross into Taiwan’s contiguous zone or territorial sea.

The PRC is escalating its campaign to bring Taiwan’s surrounding waters under its jurisdiction and may be testing the willingness of foreign vessels to comply with PRC authorities in disputed waters. These exploratory steps erode Taiwan’s sovereignty while allowing the PRC to calibrate its approach to a future blockade or quarantine of Taiwan. The MSA previously conducted a “maritime law enforcement” mission east of Taiwan from June 6 to 10 in which it hailed passing commercial ships to assert its jurisdiction.[26] CCG ships have continuously patrolled east of Taiwan since June 1 and have periodically patrolled some of Taiwan’s outlying islands since 2024.[27] The PRC likely intends to expand its de facto control around Taiwan as much as possible through means short of war, which erodes Taiwan’s sovereignty, strains Taiwan’s resources, and sets favorable conditions for future PRC military operations against Taiwan.

PRC state media framed a combined PRC-Indonesian naval navigation exercise east of Taiwan as a demonstration of PRC sovereignty over Taiwan’s eastern exclusive economic zone (EEZ).The PRC and Indonesian navies conducted what the PRC MoD described as a “naval navigational exercise” on August 12.[28] PLA Navy (PLAN) guided-missile frigate Honghe and Indonesian Navy frigate KRII Gusti Ngurah Rai practiced maritime communication and coordination with one another but did not practice any warfighting capabilities.[29] PRC state-owned tabloid Global Times reported that the exercise marked the first time the PLAN and a foreign navy had conducted naval exercises in the Taiwanese EEZ east of the island.[30] Global Times quoted frequent PRC military commentator Zhang Junshe, who stated that the exercise demonstrated that the PRC “has sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the exclusive economic zone east of Taiwan Island.”[31]

Taiwan’s MAC argued that the PRC’s framing of military exercises in Taiwan’s EEZ east of the island is attempting to create “a false impression” that the PRC has jurisdiction over the waters.[32] The MAC called the exercise a “military provocation.”[33] Indonesian navy spokesperson First Admiral Tunggul stated that I Gusti Ngurah Rai was conducting bilateral exercises with Russia in Vladivostok and would conduct drills “with countries that it passes by” as it returns, including the PRC, Japan, and the United States.[34] PRC state media’s framing of the exercise supports the broader PRC campaign to assert sovereignty and jurisdiction east of Taiwan. The Indonesian statement appeared to downplay the relevance of the exercise to Taiwan, by contrast, suggesting that Indonesia may not have intended the “routine” exercise to bolster Beijing’s political signaling.

Key Takeaways

1. Taiwanese Military Exercises: Taiwan’s annual Han Kuang military exercise continued this week. The exercise included several new drills focused on realism, civil preparedness, incorporating new technologies, and countering scenarios rehearsed by the PLA.
2. PRC Law Enforcement Operations: The PRC’s Guangdong MSA announced new measures to control maritime traffic in the Taiwan Strait, citing typhoon conditions. The PRC is seeking to expand its jurisdiction over Taiwanese and international waters and test whether foreign vessels comply with PRC commands in disputed waters. The PRC’s efforts were supported by PRC state media who framed a PRC-Indonesia combined naval exercise east of Taiwan as a demonstration of PRC jurisdiction over Taiwan’s eastern EEZ.

Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan

Taiwanese authorities indicted a former secretary to a top county official for leaking the official’s travel itinerary to a CCP member. PRC intelligence is likely spying on Taiwanese politicians’ overseas travel to monitor and disrupt Taiwan’s international relationships.Taiwanese prosecutors indicted Shih Liang-yen, the former secretary to Yunlin County Magistrate Chang Li-shan, on August 6 for leaking Chang’s travel itinerary for her July 2024 visit to Japan.[35] Shih passed information about Chang’s flights, accommodations, and meeting schedule to a CCP official surnamed Mu in exchange for paid travel to the PRC.[36] Taiwanese authorities indicted Chang’s former legislative assistant, Lee Yi-hsien, on national security charges in August 2020 for allegedly passing Taiwanese government personnel lists and other sensitive documents to Huang Guanlong, a PRC Ministry of State Security (MSS) agent.[37]

PRC espionage operations likely seek detailed information on Taiwanese politicians’ overseas travel to monitor the politicians’ contacts overseas and inform the PRC’s efforts to disrupt Taiwan’s diplomacy. Czech authorities indicted Yang Yiming, a suspected MSS agent, in June for gathering blackmail material on European politicians who travelled to Taiwan or had connections to Taiwan.[38]

PRC intelligence agencies may also be seeking opportunities to harass or assault Taiwanese politicians abroad. Convicted PRC agent Yaoning “Mike” Sun tracked then-Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen during her visit to California in 2023 and sent real-time updates on her location to a PRC consular official.[39] PRC agents also tailed Taiwanese Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim during her visit to Czechia in March 2024 and reportedly planned (but did not carry out) a staged car accident targeting Hsiao during her visit, according to Czech military intelligence officials.[40]

Taiwanese authorities sentenced one retired soldier to prison and indicted another for leaking military secrets to PRC intelligence agents. PRC spies are increasingly using financial incentives to target low-ranking Taiwanese military personnel for espionage recruitment.The Taichung District Court sentenced a former Taiwanese Navy private surnamed Tsai on August 6 to two years and seven months in prison for passing documents on Taiwan’s Hsiung Feng II missile launcher vehicles and other classified military information to a PRC People’s Armed Police (PAP) intelligence officer in exchange for payment.[41] Taiwanese prosecutors in Kaohsiung indicted a retired Private First Class in the Taiwanese Army surnamed Hsu on August 7 for allegedly sending military secrets to a suspected PRC intelligence agent.[42] Prosecutors accused Hsu of transmitting military operational plans and other classified information via Telegram to an individual or group known as “PPRIT,” whom the prosecutors suspect to be linked to PRC intelligence, in exchange for money to invest in cryptocurrency and pay off debts.[43] Hsu allegedly received payment through former CTi News anchor Lin Chen-you, whom Taiwanese prosecutors indicted in May for bribing six other Taiwanese military personnel to leak military secrets to the PRC.[44] 

PRC intelligence agents are likely targeting low-ranking Taiwanese military personnel for recruitment to expand PRC spy networks in Taiwan and acquire sensitive military information. Taiwan’s National Security Bureau (NSB) Director-General Tsai Ming-yen stated in April that the PRC has shifted from recruiting mid-level Taiwanese military officers to focus on noncommissioned officers and enlisted personnel.[45] The PRC exploits financial insecurity among low-ranking Taiwanese soldiers by using financial enticements to recruit them for espionage.[46] 

PRC state media attributed Ugandan immigration authorities’ refusal of entry to Taiwanese individuals as a response to the DPP’s push to internationalize “the Taiwan question.”[47] Ugandan authorities cited the one-China principle and confiscated Taiwanese passports, refusing to return them until provided PRC passports.[48] Ugandan authorities confiscated the passport of one Taiwanese individual upon his arrival and still have not returned it at time of writing. The individual was working in Uganda with a valid work permit.[49] The authorities sent another individual, a tourist, back to Taiwan.[50] PRC state-owned tabloid Global Times published an article framing the issue as ‘“Taiwanese independence” forces’ getting narrower room on the international stage,” though at that time, there were no explicit indicators linking the immigration policy to changes in Uganda’s Taiwan policy.[51]

Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) announced that Ugandan immigration authorities also confiscated passports from three Taiwanese travelers on August 12, telling them to show PRC passports in order to have their Taiwanese passports returned.[52] MOFA also warned Taiwanese nationals against travelling to Uganda and revealed the one-China principle as the basis for Uganda’s actions.[53] The Ugandan government has not issued any official changes in entry or visa requirements for Taiwanese nationals at the time of writing, however.[54] The Ugandan decision follows Morocco’s suspension of visa processing services for Taiwanese travelers in July, effectively cutting off Taiwanese travel to Morocco.[55] Taiwan responded by suspending visa processing for Moroccan nationals.

China

Dozens of newly promoted PLA generals and lieutenant generals have replaced purged PLA leaders in the Central Military Commission (CMC), PLA services, and PLA Theater Commands. These promotions have thus far prioritized those who demonstrated political reliability and trust and individuals who would be involved in operations in Beijing and Taiwan.The PRC has conducted a wide-ranging military purge that has removed over half of its top generals since 2023, including five out of seven members of the CMC.[56] Hong Kong-based media outlet South China Morning Post(SCMP)reported on August 5 that there are only six active, publicly visible full generals in the PLA.[57] The report stated a total of 38 full generals have either been placed under investigation or disappeared from public view.[58] The PLA promoted four officers to theater commanders and generals since December 2025, including three air force generals and one discipline inspector, leadership roles within the entities of the PLA with the fewest purges. The promoted officers lacked ties to the networks of purged CMC Vice Chair Zhang Youxia or purged CMC Political Work Department Director Miao Hua, who were previously decisive in promoting generals.[59] Twenty-one of the 27 total positions at theater commander-grade and above in the PLA and PAP are currently unoccupied.[60] SCMP reported that dozens of lieutenant generals are currently covering the portfolios of purged generals, including many officers who have been lieutenant generals for less than a year.[61]

CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping is likely prioritizing promotions within the PLA based on criteria of political loyalty and trust and may be beginning with the PLA departments least impacted by the purges, such as the PLA air force and discipline inspection apparatus.[62] Xi may also be prioritizing promoting individuals within the Central and Eastern Theater Commands as he seeks to replace purged officers.[63] The Central and Eastern Theater Commands are responsible for protecting Beijing and for operations and deployments relevant to Taiwan, respectively, and they are the only two out of the five theater commands that currently have active publicly visible commanders.[64] The PLA elevated new Central and Eastern Theater Commanders in December 2025.

A cybersecurity researcher uncovered an unsecured PRC police surveillance database in Zhangjiakou targeting foreigners and PRC citizens, shedding light on surveillance operations in the PRC and presenting national security implications for Taiwanese and US citizens who travel to the PRC.The“Dynamic Control Platform for Overseas Personnel,” likely made for the Zhangjiakou Public Security Bureau, reportedly contained detailed surveillance records on nearly 12,000 people.[65] The database included records of over 700 foreign residents of Zhangjiakou and more than 300 foreign journalists, international students, individuals from Taiwan and Hong Kong, and PRC activists and fugitives.[66] Some of the individuals identified in the database had never been to Zhangjiakou.[67] The database listed each individual’s passport number, cellphone number, nationality, occupation, birth date, marital status, children’s names, and sometimes religion.[68] The data also included photos and facial recognition data from surveillance cameras, medical records, bills, flight and train information, movements around Zhangjiakou, frequent locations they visited, and any connections with other individuals in the database.[69]

The Zhangjiakou surveillance database provides a much more detailed picture of the PRC’s surveillance apparatus and raises security concerns for Taiwanese, US, and other foreign citizens in the PRC as well as broader national security concerns. The PRC could use this surveillance data to gather information on sensitive foreign national security, technology, or trade matters by monitoring foreign travelers involved in these issues. The PRC could also use this surveillance data to persecute or coerce Taiwanese citizens, especially those it accuses of supporting “separatism” and those with personal involvement or family connections in Taiwanese politics and important institutions. Zhangjiakou is a prefecture-level city in the PRC’s northwestern Hebei province. It is likely that Zhangjiakou’s police surveillance database is indicative of the level of surveillance against foreigners, including Taiwanese and US nationals, outside of PRC major cities, implying that similar police surveillance databases may be further widespread across other PRC cities.

PRC global rare earth exports from January to June 2026 declined by 16 percent compared with the same period in 2025. This decrease may reflect the PRC’s restriction of rare earths as a tool of economic coercion. Japanese media outlet Nikkeireported that PRC exports of seven rare earths to Japan fell by 51 percent and exports of rare earths to the United States fell by 28 percent in compared to the first half of 2025.[70] The seven restricted rare earths include samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium, and yttrium.[71] The PRC accounts for 70 percent of the global production of rare earths used in electric vehicles, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, radar systems, and thermal barrier coatings for jet engines.[72]

The PRC uses its dominance over rare earths exports to pressure consumer nations into creating a more favorable market environment for the PRC.[73] The PRC has demonstrated this coercive approach over the past year, restricting rare-earth exports to the United States in April 2025 in retaliation for a US 34 percent tariff increase on PRC goods.[74] The PRC can also leverage supply chain dependencies to coerce other countries into reducing support for Taiwan. The PRC tightened controls on Japan’s access to PRC rare earths in January amid tensions over Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae’s November 2025 remarks indicating that Japan could intervene militarily in a Taiwan contingency.[75]

Northeast Asia

South Korea

South Korean police arrested two PRC nationals, who were formerly PLA enlisted officers, for allegedly engaging in espionage targeting the United States Forces Korea (USFK). South Korea is expanding its legal options to punish PRC spies and infiltrators.The South Korean Gyeonggi Nambu Provincial Police announced on August 11 that they had arrested a PRC national for spying on military communications near Gunsan Airport.[76] Gunsan Airport is a multipurpose airport where USFK and Korean Air Force personnel are stationed.[77] The PRC national reportedly intercepted military radio communications between the control tower and fighter jets in April using a unidirectional Software-defined Radio (SDR).[78] South Korean police confirmed that the suspect entered South Korea multiple times on a tourist visa since January 2024, including during active US-South Korea combined air exercises.[79] South Korean police concurrently arrested another PRC national who leveraged long-term residency in South Korea to recruit an insider at the USFK Headquarters to exfiltrate military intelligence.[80] The suspect, who operated a private military store near the base, recruited a South Korean civilian employee working inside the base to gather intelligence on the US-South Korea Ulchi Freedom Shield combined military exercise, internal personnel records, weapon movements, and military leadership from November 2021 to May 2026.[81] Police verified that the suspects in both cases previously served in the PLA but are still investigating their connections to PRC authorities.[82]

A South Korean amendment that will take effect in September will allow South Korea to prosecute PRC agents for espionage, which will significantly increase South Korea’s legal penalties against PRC infiltrators. The South Korean National Assembly passed a revision on February 26 to significantly expand the scope of what is defined as “espionage” from actions benefiting an “enemy state” — a term exclusively applied to North Korea — to include actions benefitting “foreign countries and equivalent organizations.”[83] The revision allows South Korea to charge PRC-affiliated individuals with espionage. South Korean prosecutors charged the two PRC nationals suspects under a lesser crime called “benefiting enemy by other methods,” however, because the new amendment has not yet taken effect.[84]

PRC intelligence operations in South Korea targeting the South Korean military and USFK have increased since 2025.[85] The PRC is intensifying and refining its intelligence operations to counter US-South Korea bilateral security cooperation and prepare for strategic competition against the United States in a Taiwan or Korean Peninsula contingency. South Korean military police arrested an agent affiliated with an intelligence agency under the PLA Joint Staff Department in March 2025 who recruited an active-duty South Korean soldier to leak sensitive intelligence, including the plan for US-South Korea combined military exercises.[86] The two recent cases also indicate clear intelligence gathering objectives through advanced interception hardware as well as direct insider bribery by agents with PLA backgrounds. Many previous likely PRC-related cases comprised mostly of civilians taking photographs of military assets.[87] ISW-CDOT previously assessed that USFK and South Korea remain vulnerable to PRC espionage and influence operations due to their geographic proximity to the PRC.[88] ISW-CDOT cannot verify whether the two suspects maintain direct linkages to PRC state agencies, however.

Southeast Asia

Philippines

The PRC PAP posthumously honored two CCG officers who died when their ship collided with a PLAN ship while attempting to pursue a Philippine vessel near Scarborough Shoal.This is the PRC’s first acknowledgement of the deaths almost one year since the crash.The PAP announced on August 6 the recipients of its “Loyal Guards of the Chinese People’s Armed Police” award, including the two deceased CCG officers.[89] The Ministry of Veterans’ Affairs added their names to the national martyr registry, which said that the two officers died on a “maritime rights protection operation in the South China Sea on August 11, 2025.”[90] PRC state media reported no further details about the officers’ deaths. The date of their deaths coincides with the collision of a CCG cutter with a PLAN warship near Scarborough Shoal, however, which occurred as the CCG and PLAN tried to intercept a Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) vessel.[91] The PCG ship was resupplying Philippine fishermen near the shoal and escaped unharmed.[92] Unofficial PRC media described the circumstances of the collision in a way that blamed the Philippines without mentioning that two PRC ships had crashed into each other.[93]

The PRC seized Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines in 2012 using CCG ships and has increased the volume of patrols around the shoal in recent years. CCG, PLAN, and Chinese Maritime Militia (CMM) ships now persistently patrol in a 24-nautical mile radius around the shoal and block Philippine vessels from entering the area. The PLAN and CCG were relatively inexperienced in coordinating operations with each other until recently, however, which likely contributed to the 2025 collision

The PRC likely waited a year to confirm the deaths to avoid further aggravating the situation, either by riling up uncontrolled public anger against the Philippines or by drawing attention to the incompetence of PRC maritime operations. PRC officials did not acknowledge the crash at the time and claimed that the CCG and PLAN ships operated professionally and legitimately to defend PRC territory against a Philippine incursion.[94]

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